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A CONTRIBUTION OF SOCIOLOGY OF LA W 
TO THE INTERPRETATION OF LAW 
Masao ISHIMoTo 
Professor of Law， OsakαUniversity 
Sociology of law may be described as a branch of what is generally called 
sociology， but it has a unique academic signi:ficance in that it is the “sociology" 
of “law." 
What， then， isa sociological view of law? The approach regards law 
as a social existence， studies the causes concerning with the formation， 
evolution and extinction of law through analyses of social facts， and finally 
attempts to discover the rule of social inevitability that runs through these 
phenomena. A study of the formation， evolution and extinction of law is 
in itself a research for knowledge concerning with the facts of past and present 
and not with the facts of future. Yet， the rule discovered through analyses 
of past facts should run not only through the facts of past and present but 
also of future. Consequently the rules enable one to gain a knowledge of 
the law of future and convince him of the possibility of its judicial judgment. 
In this respect， it is like the study of legal history which， whi1e dealing with 
the facts of past， contributes to the gaining of a knowledge concerning with the 
law of future through the research of the rule of the historical inevitabi1ty. 
As stated above， sociology of law provides not on1y a factual conception 
of judiciary phenomena through analyses of facts but also valuable material 
for making the existing law work reasonably when it functions as norm. Such 
contribution to the function of jurisprudence as the science of norm is a realis帽
tic task of the sociology of law as a branch of jurisprudence and also a practical 
task which is not confined to a mere understanding of facts. The branch of 
jurisprudence which deals with law as a code of norms and anlyses its mean-
ings to give pertinent interpretation ，of them is the science of interpretation 
of law. 
What巴verthe law is and whatever the process of its formation， evolution， 
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development and extinction， itis of course only the law of present as a actual 
norm that everyone is obliged to obey or comes into direct contact with. Law 
has rea1istic relations with everyone only when it functions as a norm of an 
act， of an organization and of the judgement in court. Although jurispru-
dence attains an erudition through accumulated knowledge gained from various 
sides of legal acts， itis primari1y in the interpretation of meanings of its 
contents that law is brought into direct contact with everyone. In this regard， 
the science of interpretation of law may be said to deal with the aspect of law 
which acts as a medium between law and men. And for the science of inter-
pretation of law， a study of legal history and of comparative jurisprudence is 
of such importance that interpretation of law can hardly function properly 
independent of it. In this respect， legal history and comparative jurisprudence 
have a certain role to play in making men and law contact with each other. 
Yet， itdoes not follow that the study of legal history and of comparative 
jurisprudence directly participates in the determination of the meaning of an 
enacted law. Instead， these work indirectly through the activities of the science 
of interpretation of law which has inherited the achievements of these 
branches. 
Such re1ationship app1ies equally to the sociology of law. Sociology of 
law in itself is a search for knowledge of facts， but only when it is tied up with 
the interpretation of law and made use of by the latter， itcontributes to the 
practical activity of law， i.e.， determining the meaning and content of the 
norm. 
First of al1， it should be mentioned that sociology of law deals with exist-
ing laws as the object of its study on the premise that laws do exist. But 
“laws exist" is means that“laws are considered to exist as such." In other 
words， laws exist because they are considered to exist， they are laws because 
they are considered as laws. Obviously， itis possible to construct law in 
pure conception. But laws which are not considered as existing are not 
laws. lt is quite possible to think about a universal law governing the entire 
mankind or a divine law in a divine land or the natural law which governs the 
physica1 world. But these are actual1y not laws. Law is something that is 
considered as law. And so for as“to consider" in this sense means nothing 
but an act of someone， law is something that has been brought担toexistence 
and cre 
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that the divine law or the natural law is not treated as law in the science of 
interpretation of law or in sociologyof law. This is important not only to 
avoid to make such a mistake as to borrow the authority of the divine law or 
the naturallaw to justify the opinion in discussion in the spheres of interpretation 
of law or sociology of law， but also to remember that the basis of law should 
be sought outside the authority of the divine law or the naturallaw. 
Now， how can such law be perceived? If law is beyond perception， it
is impossible to study it. However， when we speak of the creation and 
existence of law， we do not refer to the legislation or enaction of law alone. 
Some of the customs which have been accepted as legal order in the course 
of tIme are also law， considered and created by society. Legislation or enaction 
is only one of the form of creation of law. 
The first problem for the perception of law is how is it possible to interpret 
and understand the meaning of the words of law， whether it is a statute 
law or custom .1aw. To point out mere1y that law exists in written form as 
a code or that custom law， ifnot written， governs a mass of life (socitety) does 
not mean the perception of law. Perception of law is， first and foremost， 
lies in grasping its contents. The manner by which the contents of written 
law and custom law are manifested di宜ersfrom each other. The former is 
of course expressed in written words. On the contrary， the contents of the 
custom law or the unwritten law， in general， are expressed in words that 
have not been written. In other words， the custom law or the unwtitten law 
is expressed by means of certain words that could b巴putin written form if 
it is necessary. And as far as the meaning of words is concerned， there is no 
di在erencebetween the writ総nlaw and the unwritten law. Therefore， the 
asking how the perception of law is possible is due to the asking how the 
grasping of the meanings of the words of law is possible. 
The meaning of a certain word can， of course ，be obtained担 adictionary. 
But the meaning which the dictionary gives is only that of the word which is 
deemed and agreed among the people lived in the territory in which the word 
is used. But in attempting to p紅白ivethe meaning of words as an expression 
of law， it is not enough to understand this meaning agreeded among them alone， 
for now we refer to the meaning as a norm. Since a law as a norm is a part of 
the unifi.ed legal order of a society， the meaning of a law should be compati 
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which regulates the social life， the object of the control of law， n a difinite 
direction. In other words， since law aims to bring unity and order to social 
life， words of law should be used to achieve the aim. As a result of this， 
the meaning of words employed in law shou1d not merely be obtained from the 
dictionary， but from the conditions and facts which would be arised by the 
application of the law on social life. So far as it is concerned， what we are 
concerned about is not the meaning which is conclusive in itself as given in a 
dictionary， but the meaning of words which is actually at work as norm. 
If law embodies the system of a certain order which is not self-contradicting， 
then it is assumed that law is unified by the spirit and ideology which are at 
the bottom of it. And to bring an order to the social life words with com幽
monly accepted meanings are employed. It is natural that， words which are 
the common means of understanding among people come to be recognized as 
possessing certain fixed meaning， asgiven in the. dictionary. But it does not 
follow that the actual meaning of words are always the same巴venwhen they 
are used as a norm， and as the result of it， they frequently include unexpected 
or some di宜erentmeaning as their function from that which has hitherto 
been accepted. The Civil Code of Japan， for instance， isbased on the funda-
mental principle that everyone always has an equal pr・otectionby law on his 
interests. The principle is not expressed in words anywhere in the Civil Code， 
but can easily be discerned when the whole code is understood systematically. 
The principle is also in accordance with the most fundamental spirit of modern 
law that everyone must be treated equally under the law. 
The Civil Code recognizes， as the civil liability，“liability with fault." 
This principle means that those who have injured another intentionally or 
negligently should be liable to the results， whi1e those who are not gui1ty of 
negligence should not be he1d liable. This is based on the concept that modern 
citizens emancipated from the feudalistic bands should be held responsible for 
the outcomes of their own volition of intents and their own voluntary acts， 
only when any factor of malice or negligence morally accusable is present， so
long as it is deemed justifiable that they may act autonomous as free individuals. 
So this principle provides an exemption from any responsib出tywhere there 
exists no accusable negligence. Artic 
5 
Artic1e has remained unchanged ever since the promulgation of the Civil Code. 
But also was the meaning of this sentense unchanged at all? In the earlier 
period when the law was first written， the principle of the liability with fau1t 
(culpability) was adopted as one of the guiding principlesぱ thecivil law， 
and， the actual conditions of sociallife were then stil very simple， where it was 
found usually that江anyoneoccurred damage without fault， there was fau1t 
on the part of victim. The realities of society were then so simple that it was 
thought su盟cientto give legislative consid巴rationto the extent that an excep帽
tional provision has been provided in Artic1e 717* in relation to the liability 
without fault on the part of the owner of the structure on land， soas to cover 
the possible occurrence of a situation where damage is caused by one of the 
parties to the other， notwithstanding both of them are without fault equally. 
And no further consideration for such a situation was then hardly thought 
necessary. Thus， from the viewpoint of the spirit of the Civil Code which is 
based on equal protection of the interests of the parties concerned， the legis-
lative consideration only to such case was thought almost enough， and when 
it have happened that any damage had been caused in an instance other than 
the above mentioned， itwas usually found that either the person who caused 
damage or th巴personwho suffered damage was negligent， hence application 
of Artic1e 709 of Civil Code would eventually make the person who was neglト
gent take responsibility for・anydamage resulted. This did not con:flict with 
the spirit of equal protection of interests of al citizens， the fundamental principle 
of the civil law. The pr恒cipleof liability with fault (culpability) was thus 
adopted as one of the fundamental principle of civi1 law. 
However， things have undergone changes today in parallel with the evolu-
tion of society. The advancements of industrial machinery and the progress 
of chemistry have brought about enlarged and complex industrial systems 
with increased risks for enterprises. This trend has further been enhanced 
by the development of transport facilities， and with the advent of the atomic 
age， this tendency is being more accelerated. As a result of it， there have 
arisen various phenomena that despite both parties concerned were without 
傘Art.709， Japanese Civil Code “If damage is caused to a third person by a defect 
in the construction or maintenance of a structure erected on lond， the possession of such 
structure is bound to make compensation for the damage to the person injnred; but if the 
possessor has used due care to prevent the happening of the damage， the owner is bound 
to make compensation (I parag.) 
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fauIt， damages are inflicted by the one to the other in consequence. If Artic1e 
709 of the Civi1 Code should be applied at this stage， the result would be that 
the person without fault who caused damage wi1 be protected and exempted 
from the responsibility， whi1e the person without fault who suffered damage 
may not be protected as a matter of course. This wi1 give rise to a situation 
where the person who suffered damage is forced to forbear the damage so 
long as the person who caused damage was not negligent， namely without 
fault. Such wi1 ultimate1y go against the fundamental spirit of the Civi1 Code 
which intends to provide equal protection of interests for al citizens. 
Here the principle of liabi1ity with fault comes to reveal a phase confiicting 
with the fundamental principle of the Civi1 Code. Viewed in this light， whereas 
the text of Article 709 of the Civil Code retains the definite meaning gram-
matically as primari1y agreed as an expressed sentence， when it is applied to 
the objects of law， itsreal meaning， not grammatic but functional， itsmeaning 
as a norm， namely such as perceived on the basis of its functions mutually 
di宜ersfrom what was original1y designed. Now， granted that the under-
standing of the meaning of the words of law do not signify the grasping of the 
grammatic meaning which seems continued as ever， but do relate to the real 
functional meaning as a norm， in general， the significance as a norm which 
lies at the bottom of the words of the artic1e may well be said to have under-
gone a change in paral1el with the changes in the realities of social life， the 
object of law， notwithstanding the text of the artide remained in same ex噌
presslOn. 
However， from the viewpoint of the understanding and perception of law， 
the philosophy of law may be said to be a search for “law to be" and practical 
jurisprudence， for “law in existence."， in the territory of jurisprudence， the 
science of interpretation of law and the sociology of law differ from each other 
in that they are mutual1y in di宜erentpositions as to how to perceive law. In 
the sociology of law， perception of law is made from the angle how an existing 
law is functioning as a norm. In other words， for the sociology of law， itis 
one of its task to recognize the meaning of an existing law as a norm when the 
law is applied， whereby it makes sign述cantcontribution to the execution of 
the task of the science of interpretation of law. In connection with the pro暢
blem of civi1 liability 
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of interpretation of law to study how the principle of liability with fault would 
function， as the principle is practically applied， but this study belongs to the 
subject matter of the sociology of law. Now， as a resu1t of the substantial 
development of civil society， the principle of the liability with fault which had 
been adopted in Article 709 of the Civi1 Code， asone of the guiding principles 
of civillaw， which used to work as a norm in harmony with the fundamental 
principle of civil law， name1y the equal protection of interests of everyon巴，
has now come to expose its negative or con宜ictingpotentials， which are， how-
ever， inherent to that guiding principle itself， and it has become a task of the 
sociology of law to perceive this function of law and its related changes in 
connection with the realiti巴sof society. This may also act as the motive power 
for new activities of the interpretation of.law， and in this sense， this phase of 
study contributes much to the science of interpretation of law. The reason 
is that the science of interpretation of law， asa study of norm， isassigned for 
a task of understanding what meaning a real existing law must hold， which is 
quite different from that of sociology of law， asdescribed above， As referred 
to the example given above， the principle of liability with fau1t could， inthe 
past， realize the effect of the fundamental principle and spirit of the civillaw 
which provides equal protection of interests for al citizens. However， since 
there have been a marked increase of instances where damages are in出cted
regardless of the fact that al the parties concern巴dwere without fau1t at al， 
this provision of the law now became to act contradictory to the fundamental 
principle of the civil law that everyone is protected equally with another about 
his interest. when this principle of liability with fault is applied. Thus the 
wording of the law remained unchanged， but the contents of the law， or its 
function as a norm， has undergone a change. In other words， the law itself 
has changed in its function as a norm. If it is so， a search must be made so 
as to realize equal protection of everybody's interests as past when Article 
709 of the Civil Code used to function as one of the main stays of the systema-
tic stlUcture of the Civil Code. Then， inwhat manner should this provision 
be interpreted， or how should any given part of the text of this provision be 
understood， so as to arrange the Civil Code without 
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which apparently remains unchanged， has suffered an entire change in its 
contents. Therefore， the task of the science of interpretation of law is， 
by altering the interpretation of the words used in the law， to make it 
possible to achieve its original aim， and to recover and retain its identity as 
a law. Here 1ies an inevitable restriction as to the method of interpretation 
of law， namely， the interpretation of law is conditioned by objective criterion. 
It may be unjust if a rectified or modified int巴rpretationis given on the ground 
that the result of app1ication of a certain existing law is only judged 
inadequate through the prevailing lega1 sentiment， for such is no other than 
to make the interpretation of law depend merely upon the subjective judge剛
ment of those who study about the interpretation of law or the judge. Even 
though也eymay urge indeed that it is based on not individual but socia1 
current legal sentiment， itcan hardly be anything but a subjective judgement 
in most cases. Of course， what we desire is that those who study about the 
inte1'pretation of law as well as the judge would directly contact and perceive 
the universally accepted idea or norm. However， granting that there is such 
an able judge， ifthe meaning and content of existing law should be inter尚
preted泊 anotherway out of sympathy with one of the parties concerned， it
would result in a substantia1 disregard of law on the plea of interpretation of 
law. The liability without fauIt for an ilegal actis a1so recognized theoretically 
on the identical basis. But when this is recognized only because of sympathy 
with the person who suffered damage， ifthere is any person who interprets 
the law in the opposite way， there wil be found no justi怠ableground to per-
suade him in the face of his inverse assertion. Hence， even though it is 
acceptable in the light of moral and ethica1 sentiment， itshall be denied from 
the standpoint of interpretation of law. In this sense， interpretation of law 
is scarcely almighty， and ther巴seemsto be no other way than to endeavor to 
amend 01' extinct such an immoral law. However， as described above， even 
when a law has undergone a change in its function as a norm despite its text 
remains unchanged， the original aim of the law may be attained on1y by re-
covering its function as a norm. It will be a misinterpr邑tationof the law in 
this case， ifthe words of the provision of law which have a1ready changed in 
its function are interpret 
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originally not intended by the law. In such a case， itis inevitable to interpret 
the words of the provision of law with some modi:fcation so as to make the 
law function properly. Here， an alteration or modi:fcation in the meaning 
of the text of law never imply any change of the law. At interpreting of 
law on such an occasion， no room is left for free choice in approving the meaning 
of the text of law by the subjective view of the one who interpretes the law， and 
here， an objective criterion is set to the effect that interpretation of law should 
be made in such a manner that the initial aim of the law will be achieved. 
Reasonableness of interpretation shal1 be judged in accordance with this cri-
terion. An interpretation of law can objectively be regarded justi:fable only 
when the original aim of the 1aw is gained， and when the function which has 
once been 10st is regained. This belongs to inevitable ev01ution of 1aw. Again 
refer to the aforementioned example. While Artic1e 709 of the Civil Code has 
10st its original function， and can now work only contradictory to the require-
ments set by the fundamental principle of the civil 1aw that everyone 
must be protected equally of his interests; its present function which can no 
longer achieve the initia1 aim of the 1aw， must be now denied， and instead， 
aiming that both parties concerned will be equally protected againstthe damage 
arised despite both parties have been without fault a new interpretation must 
be made， wher巴bythe re1ated responsibility may be shared by both parties. 
Then the text of the artic1e is， thus， given a new interpretation， and such meaning 
is the inevitable consequence of the il1terpretation of the provision of 1aw， 
which may be regarded as a natura1 development induced by historical facts 
of society. If no one can deny that a law is influel1ced by the historica1 realities 
al1d suffers changes in its function， and if there is no way other than amendmel1t 
or new il1terpretation of the words of law to recover its function once 10st so 
as to be suita1e for achievement of the original aim， such interpretation of 
law， asgiven above， may also be deemed as an inevitab1e effect arising in the 
course of history. Al1d how interpretation of 1aw should be made is obj己ctively
determined in the beginning already， provided the purpose of 1aw is unchal1ged. 
So it is already objecti:fed at the start. Therefore， conc1usion is obvious as to 
how the 1aw should be interpreted and how it can be reasona 
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mined by judging whether or not the newly interpreted meaning of the word 
of law does the function of fulfiling the fundamental aim of the civil law 
that everyone shal1 be given equal protection about interests. In the science of 
interpretation of law， the task of understanding of the law is not a search to 
discern what function an existing law is performing as in the case of sociology 
of law， but it implies the grasping of the meaning of the words of law which 
shall be given by new interpretation aiming that it will make the law play 
its original role against an altered function which has come to display in con-
sequence of historica1 developments of social facts. It is not an attempt to 
come to true knowledge of what is thought to exist as a law， asis the case with 
the sociology of law， but it is the perception of what ought to be thought to 
exist as a law. In this sense， whereas the sociology of law seaks to discern 
actuality and function of a law as a norm， the science of interpretation of law 
endeavor to ascertain the reasonable meaning of the words of law as a norm. 
Even though both of them intend， astheir task， to understand and perceive 
the meaning and contents of a law as a norm and not the grammatical meaning 
of the words of the law， there is a difference between them also. The former 
observes through the medium of the actual status of the law in force， while 
the latter， through the medium of the inherent functions of the law. From 
this viewpoint， itmay be said that the former perceives law in relation to its 
cause and effect， while the latter， inconnection with the aim of law. As viewed 
from this angle， the science of interpretation of law may be said to start from 
where the activities of sociology of law terminate. Equally， the sociology of 
law comes to face a new task at the point where the activities of interpretation 
of law end. 
Now， what does it signify that law undergoes evolution in parallel with 
the historical progress of a society? It means a process of developments 
in which changes of the realities of society bring about alterations in the 
function of law， and in consequence， ifthe law want to recover its original 
function， the meaning of the words of provision of the law come to require 
to be newly interpreted. When it became obvious that a law wil 
no longer regain its original function which has been changed or ]ost 
even though the meaning of the words of the law may be newly interpreted， 
the law shall necessarily be amended or annu 
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and is not only caused by alteration or innovation of law by the hand of the 
legislator. Contrariwise， interpretation of law may be said rather to accelerate 
evolution of law in this sense. However， such interpretation of law shall not 
be based on the subjective intent or motive of the ones who interpret the law， 
but be backed up by inevitability originating in historical realities irrespective 
as to whether or not it may be to the liking of the one who interprets the 
law. This is due to the fact that law in gen巴ralinvolves two mutually confiict-
ing elements， i.e.， a definite aim and the proposition for realization of such 
aim. But such an aim or a proposition cannot go into action when the one 
is separated from the other. However， when this law once work on social 
facts， the proposition fulfils. a certain function， and changes its function in 
accordance with the changing of the social condition. In this case， ifthe aim 
remains intact， two elements may come to confiict each other. A fact that 
law includes variable and invariable elements in this manner， isthe motive 
of changes and developments of the law. Now， granting that law does change 
in their function as the social condition changes， do巴sthe social condition changes 
round so incessant1y? In a long run， the social realities may change， come 
into being， and extinct in the course of the development of the society， but， 
taking a certain specific period of time， itis possible that there is almost no 
change as a matter of fact. However the function of law which rules the social 
reality which changes very slowly， may be presumed to undergo a change also 
but very rare1y. In such a region， the text of law wi1l maintain its significance 
as norm as it was set at the time of promulgation for a long duration of time. 
In this respect， the sociology of law also finds itself in identical situation. 
However， it is hardly possible that social condition does not entirely change 
in the course of history， and even when it should happen so， itmay be 
incidental. In conclusion， apart from the question of r巴:lativedi侃culty，it 
may be considered that tasks are always found for the sociology of law and the 
science of interpretation of law， respectively， ina territory where law governs. 
Yet， law does not necessari1y exist in al the corners of human society as 
written law or custom law. If social order is called law in a broad sense， 
then it may be allowed to say“where a society is， there is a law." This 
implies on 
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the one lacking legislation from the time of promulgation， orit can be a region 
of sociallife which has been created as a blind point of law in the development 
of the social reality. But in human society， social order itself is present 
always regardless whether it is good or bad. This is also same in the above 
two kinds of territories of sociallife. Particular1y， inthe former， itis frequent 
that custom law is in existence， but in the latter， since such a condition comes 
in being as a new fact of sociallife， itis usual that there is not even the custom 
law. The reason is that formation of a custom law requires， asits pr官 nise，
numerous repetitions and pr叫ongedcontinuation of social life extending over 
a long duration of time. 
In a territory of human life， where statute law does not exist， but custom 
law does， a study of interpretation of law is nothing but ascertaining and 
making clear of the meaning of the words of law implied by such custom law， 
particular1y through comparison with the law elucidated in the related 
statutes. For example， in the event that within the scope of the civil law， 
when such a practical function of custom law come to con:flict with the 
fundametal principle of the civil law， there wil1 be found no room for any 
action to overcome the contradiction by making revision on the interpretation 
of the words of the law， and al what can be done is only to keep watch over 
the changes which may take place with the custom law itself brought about 
by changes in socia1 customs. Accordingly it is very probable that relatively 
les interest about it is taken in the aspect of science of interpretation of law. 
On the contrary， for the sociology of law， the .understanding and perception 
of such custom law， and the investigation in its socia1 functions wil1 offer 
a sphere of colorful studies. Of course， the analyses of custom laws or socia1 
customs themselves are of importance as the analyses of historical facts in the 
study of history， since it holds much significance as a fundamental study. 
However， the problem serving as the premise in determining what is a 
custom law， namely， the problem as to what should be picked up as the custom 
out of the practices of sociallife， and what should be taken as a custom law， 
are particular1y泊 portantas the question concerning with the category of 
custom law. Another point which gives greater significance to studies of social 
customs or custom laws， isthat they have been formed under a minimum of 
influences 0 
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approved by the people at large， when the compulsory force has slackened， such 
control will soon be gone. Contrariwise， when approved and even desired by the 
people， anything may continue to exist for a long time without any control. 
In this sense， the customs of human society always agree with the people's 
desire and become the base for the formation of legal character such as 
custom law. Such customs may sometimes be governed by antiquat吋
ideology as viewed from progressive legislation， while on the contrary， social 
customs may be so progress巴ivethat legislation is left behind. In these 
cases we. can notice that the customs of a society assume a certain critical 
attitude， or sometimes they have factors of resistance towards statute law. 
Moreover， the fact that they are not what have been created but what have 
grown and been formed in natural course， and they keep close internal 
relations to other products of civil culture~ enhance the significance of studies 
in this field. In this respect， the sociology of law is assigned with a v巴ry
important task in this fie1d of study， and its results contribute much to jurispru-
dence in the sense of clearing the way for legislation. However， because it 
is di血cultfor social customs or custom laws ;to last long time in a form 
disagreeing with statute laws， in畳uencedby legislation， and in consequence of 
changes in the peoples' legal sentiment by the effects of current legal thought， 
social customs and custom laws undeniably come to change such as it may 
not be possible if these influences are absent. In this meaning， authoritative 
elements can also bear influence upon the formation of social customs and 
custom laws， though insignificant after al， and analyses of such subjects a詑
to be expected with studies of sociology of Iaw. 
The subj巴ctto be dealt with by the sociology of Iaw and the int巴rpretation
of law in connection with the region creat巴das a blind point of Iaw as a result 
of the evolution of social condition， wher巴 therewere statute laws in the 
beginning， may， after al， be summarized as changes in the function of law and 
justifiable interpretations of the words of law in relation to such changes. 
As to this point， another view may also be set forth. For example， since 
infliction of damages in despite of the absence of fault， such as those originating 
in the developments of modern large-scale enterprises， have never been anticipated 
by the legislators， consequent1 
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demands legislation on a new basis and another which urges that based on 
any provision of existing laws and by discerning the prevai1ng legal sentim巴nt
in accordance with the methods of sociology of law， reasonable norm shall be 
found. Besides， there is also present the view admitting that the latter concep-
tion shal1 be adopted until the time arrives when a new legislation can be 
expected. The latter conception is more or les noted in the arguments of those 
belonging to the school of liberal jurisprudence insists upon so咽cal1ed“living
laws." 1n any case these concepts recognize a lack of law. 1n the author's 
opinion， this shal1 rather be considered as a problem pertaining to a change in 
the function of law and to inevitable revision on the interpretation of the 
meaning of law in the face of the same social facts. That is to say， the 
situation shall be perceived as a problem in which law shal1 necessarily make 
evolution by itself for the purpose of self-preservation of legal order. 
Between the view that considers the law became faulty and the foregoing view， 
some points are found which may be attributed to defference of attitudes in 
perceiving things， but both follow almost the identical way of thinking as a 
whole and fundamentally. Even so there is the difference in the mann巴rof 
dealing with the problem， which is due to the difference in law of thinking 
hidden deep 9-own at the bottom. One of the views is based on concept that 
social facts or the social conditions which are the object to be ruled by the 
norm are changeable， but law itself is not. On the contrary， the aforemen・
tioned way of thinking is founded on the concept that law develops by itself in 
parallel with the historical progress of the u:alities of society which are the 
object for law to govern. But the former concept does not basical1y deny the 
latter， and vice versa. Thus it may be taken as difference in the way of thinking. 
1n this field of study， the relations between the science of interpretation of law 
and the sociology of law are most closely related irrespective as to whichever 
view lies at the bottom. 1n one of the way of thinking， many accomplishments 
by liberal jurists proved the above fact， while on the other hand， studies on 
sociology of law along the changes in the function of law have also contributed 
greatly to the necessary progress of science of interpretation of law. 1ndeed， 
apart from the results of the studies of sociology of law， science of interpret 
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1n connection with the principle of freedom of contract which was the breeding 
ground of labor laws， or the theory of ownership system which are developing 
towards socialization or denial of the conception of absolute ownership， and 
other norms related to re1ations of civi11ife which undergo changes in accordance 
with historical progress of society， this studies wi1 promote their evolution， 
and work on them decisively. 
As to what should be the subject to be dealt with in sociology of 
law， they may be made re1atively c1ear in one phase， when they are brought into 
comparison with the science of interpr悦ationof law， although this may not 
necessarily be applicable in al cases， and in this resp巴ctit is also obvious what 
contribution it would make to jurisprudence担 general.
